



Wise	  Collectives	  Prepared	  for	  The	  Epistemic	  Life	  of	  Collectives	  (OUP,	  Fricker	  and	  Brady	  eds.,forthcoming	  2013).	  	  
I.	  Can	  Collective	  Agents	  Be	  Wise?	  Increasingly	  common	  in	  recent	  philosophical	  literature	  is	  the	  claim	  that	  collectives	  can	  make	  judgements	  and	  perform	  actions	  (see	  Pettit	  and	  List	  2011,	  Copp	  2006,	  Anderson	  2007,	  Gilbert	  1987,	  Fricker	  2010,	  Lahroodi	  2007).	  	  Furthermore,	  the	  beliefs	  and	  actions	  of	  a	  collective	  are	  claimed	  to	  be	  non-­‐reducible	  the	  judgments	  and	  actions	  of	  individual	  members	  of	  the	  collective,	  but	  it	  is	  only	  the	  latter	  that	  has	  been	  thoroughly	  investigated.	  	  Following	  this	  trend,	  I	  shall	  here	  grant,	  rather	  than	  argue,	  that	  collectives	  have	  an	  epistemic	  life.	  	  	  I	  will	  be	  interested	  in	  a	  very	  specific	  feature	  of	  collective	  cognitive	  life	  that	  has	  received	  little	  attention:	  wisdom.	  	  Even	  if	  collective	  epistemic	  agents	  have	  true	  beliefs	  and	  knowledge,	  it	  does	  not	  follow	  that	  collectives	  can	  be	  wise.	  	  	  Christian	  List	  (2010)	  has	  recently	  argued	  for	  a	  ‘thin’	  conception	  of	  collective	  wisdom	  that	  is	  achieved	  by	  solving	  what	  he	  calls	  correspondence	  and	  
consistency	  problems	  facing	  collective	  agents.	  	  However,	  List’s	  thin	  account	  of	  collective	  agency	  cannot	  ground	  a	  thicker,	  more	  traditional	  conception	  of	  wisdom,	  where	  this	  would	  invoke	  aspects	  of	  character,	  virtues	  and	  vices,	  motivation	  and	  actions	  that	  promote	  important	  ends.	  	  Miranda	  Fricker	  examines	  thicker	  collective	  states	  in	  her	  excellent	  essay	  “Can	  Institutions	  Have	  Virtues?”	  (2010),	  and	  argues	  that	  institutions	  can	  be	  virtuous	  or	  vicious,	  although	  she	  does	  not	  directly	  address	  the	  virtue	  of	  wisdom.	  	  Combining	  the	  insights	  of	  both,	  I	  argue	  that	  a	  thick	  account	  of	  collective	  wisdom	  is	  available	  by	  using	  Fricker’s	  account	  of	  ‘acting	  under	  a	  practical	  identity’.	  	  On	  List’s	  rigorous	  but	  thin	  account,	  a	  collective	  is	  wise	  in	  virtue	  of	  using	  sufficiently	  coherent	  aggregation	  procedures.	  In	  contrast,	  I	  will	  defend	  a	  thicker	  account	  of	  collective	  wisdom	  according	  to	  which	  individual	  epistemic	  virtues	  play	  an	  essential	  role	  and	  which	  carries	  more	  practical	  implications	  than	  List’s	  thin	  collective	  wisdom.	  	  It	  is	  easy	  enough	  to	  imagine	  an	  individual	  that	  has	  an	  epistemic	  life,	  but	  is	  not	  wise.	  Animals	  and	  children	  are	  probably	  amongst	  them,	  and	  of	  course	  there	  are	  the	  many	  unwise	  adult	  human	  beings.	  	  While	  consensus	  might	  be	  emerging	  that	  collectives	  also	  have	  epistemic	  lives,	  they	  might	  turn	  out	  to	  be	  like	  the	  animals,	  children	  or	  many	  unwise	  adult	  humans;	  cognitively	  endowed,	  but	  yet	  not	  capable	  of	  wisdom.	  	  Philip	  Pettit	  and	  Christian	  List’s	  recent	  work	  on	  judgment	  aggregation	  (2011)	  shows	  that	  collective	  agents	  face	  unique	  problems	  in	  forming	  rational	  and	  coherent	  judgements.	  	  	  In	  fact,	  these	  will	  be	  exactly	  the	  kinds	  of	  challenges	  that	  wise	  collectives	  will	  be	  expected	  to	  surmount.	  	  A	  number	  of	  	  “impossibility	  results”	  demonstrate	  that	  collectives	  are	  very	  susceptible	  to	  forming	  inconsistent	  beliefs,	  and	  the	  culprit	  can	  be	  found	  in	  the	  aggregation	  procedures	  used,	  where	  this	  is	  some	  function	  that	  take	  us	  from	  sets	  of	  individual	  epistemic	  states	  to	  epistemic	  states	  of	  the	  collective	  itself.	  	  	  	  	  	  
The	  findings	  on	  looming	  collective	  irrationality	  are	  both	  good	  and	  bad	  from	  the	  perspective	  of	  collective	  wisdom.	  	  The	  results	  from	  Pettit,	  List	  and	  others	  show	  that	  very	  straightforward	  and	  presumably	  common	  procedures	  for	  aggregating	  individual	  judgments	  (e.g.,	  	  “majority	  rule”)	  will	  regularly	  violate	  basic	  laws	  of	  logic,	  including	  modus	  ponens	  and	  even	  conjunction.	  	  Since	  this	  irrationality	  will	  typically	  not	  be	  found	  in	  the	  individual	  members,	  it	  seems	  to	  be	  a	  genuinely	  collective	  irrationality.	  	  	  	  The	  numerous	  ‘impossibility	  results’	  facing	  collective	  agents	  are	  clearly	  worrisome	  for	  any	  account	  of	  collective	  judgment,	  but	  they	  also	  create	  the	  possibility	  of	  a	  certain	  kind	  of	  collective	  wisdom.	  	  We	  can	  say	  that	  a	  collective	  achieves	  this	  form	  of	  wisdom	  precisely	  by	  achieving	  basic	  rationality	  in	  its	  collective	  judgments.	  Combining	  insights	  from	  both	  Condorcet	  Jury	  Theorem	  results	  and	  recent	  developments	  in	  judgment	  aggregation	  theory	  (that	  can	  now	  identify	  the	  properties	  of	  aggregation	  procedures	  that	  create	  the	  problematic	  results),	  List	  argues	  that	  we	  can	  properly	  attribute	  wisdom	  to	  collectives	  with	  certain	  virtues	  in	  their	  aggregation	  procedures,	  although	  he	  admits	  that	  this	  is	  a	  ‘thin’	  kind	  of	  wisdom.	  Attributions	  of	  wisdom	  to	  a	  collective	  will	  be	  true	  simply	  because	  of	  certain	  virtues	  possessed	  by	  the	  aggregation	  procedures	  that	  partially	  constitute	  the	  collective.	  	  	  Since	  these	  virtuous	  aggregation	  functions	  achieve	  basic	  rationality	  in	  the	  face	  of	  numerous	  impossibility	  results	  (to	  which	  lesser	  collectives	  might	  fall	  victim),	  it	  is	  not	  improper	  to	  regard	  a	  basically	  rational	  collective	  as	  wise	  in	  some	  sense.	  	  	  	  	  	  List’s	  account	  of	  collective	  wisdom	  will	  be	  discussed	  in	  detail	  in	  the	  following	  section,	  but	  I	  will	  close	  this	  section	  by	  considering	  the	  sense	  in	  which	  his	  account	  is	  ‘thin’	  and	  why	  he	  stays	  away	  from	  a	  thicker	  account.	  	  To	  see	  how	  thin	  his	  account	  is,	  first	  consider	  that	  List	  seems	  to	  have	  something	  closer	  to	  collective	  knowledge	  in	  mind.	  A	  collective	  agent	  that	  satisfies	  List’s	  desiderata	  will	  be	  sufficiently	  reliable	  by	  virtue	  of	  meeting	  correspondence	  problems	  (Condorcet	  Theorem	  results),	  and	  will	  be	  (subjectively)	  rational	  in	  virtue	  of	  meeting	  coherence	  problems	  (Pettit	  and	  List	  impossibility	  results).	  	  This	  might	  be	  a	  decent	  conception	  of	  collective	  knowledge,	  but	  wisdom	  has	  an	  essential	  agentive	  aspect	  at	  least	  in	  this	  respect:	  a	  wise	  agent	  
could	  and	  should	  act	  on	  their	  knowledge.	  	  Any	  item	  of	  understanding	  that	  could	  not	  be	  acted	  upon	  because	  it	  exceeds	  the	  agent’s	  capacities	  would	  not	  seem	  to	  constitute	  wisdom,	  nor	  would	  a	  person	  be	  thought	  wise	  if	  they	  failed	  to	  recognize	  that	  they	  
should	  act	  on	  this	  item	  of	  understanding	  if	  and	  when	  it	  applies.	  	  Wisdom	  also	  essentially	  involves	  especially	  valuable	  forms	  of	  knowledge.	  	  The	  nature	  of	  wisdom	  in	  general	  will	  be	  discussed	  in	  the	  next	  section,	  but	  we	  can	  fix	  ideas	  here	  by	  saying	  that	  wisdom	  is	  some	  form	  of	  “knowledge	  of	  how	  to	  live	  well”,	  or	  “understanding	  of	  the	  problems	  and	  predicaments	  inherent	  in	  human	  life”,	  where	  both	  are	  understood	  to	  characteristically	  lead	  to	  action	  for	  an	  agent,	  or	  at	  least	  to	  give	  a	  wise	  agent	  a	  reason	  for	  action,	  and	  such	  actions	  will	  typically	  promote	  the	  most	  important	  aims	  of	  the	  agent.	  The	  traditional	  “thick”	  property	  we	  attribute	  to	  individuals	  also	  involves	  accurate	  normative	  judgments	  about	  what	  is	  most	  important	  from	  the	  standpoint	  of	  the	  agent.	  	  	  	  
Thin	  though	  it	  is,	  List	  gives	  a	  rigorous	  account	  of	  a	  legitimate	  form	  of	  collective	  wisdom,	  and	  I	  will	  examine	  this	  in	  some	  detail	  below.	  In	  defense	  of	  a	  thicker	  account	  of	  collective	  wisdom,	  I	  will	  then	  examine	  Miranda	  Fricker’s	  work	  on	  ‘individual	  action	  under	  a	  practical	  identity’.	  	  I	  conclude	  with	  an	  argument	  that	  an	  account	  of	  thick	  collective	  wisdom	  can	  inform	  educational	  policy	  and	  ground	  a	  general	  social	  commitment	  to	  cultivating	  individual	  intellectual	  virtues.	  	  	  
2.	  wisdom	  in	  general	  	  The	  nature	  of	  wisdom	  itself	  is,	  of	  course,	  a	  difficult	  and	  somewhat	  neglected	  issue	  in	  the	  history	  of	  philosophy.	  	  Dennis	  Whitcomb	  recently	  distinguishes	  Apologetic,	  Two	  
Fold	  and	  Practical	  views.	  	  Epistemic	  humility	  and	  accuracy	  characterize	  the	  Apologetic	  approaches	  (see	  Ryan	  2007	  and	  interesting	  empirical	  work	  from	  Whitcomb’s	  essay),	  and	  is	  exemplified	  by	  Socrates.	  	  The	  Practical	  accounts	  (Ryan	  1999)	  see	  wisdom	  as	  involving	  a	  free	  agent	  that	  succeeds	  in	  living	  well,	  where	  their	  living	  well	  is	  caused	  by	  their	  knowledge	  of	  how	  to	  live	  well1.	  	  Or,	  more	  simply	  from	  Nozick	  (1990)	  “knowing	  the	  problems	  and	  predicaments	  human	  beings	  typically	  find	  themselves	  in”	  where	  this	  knowledge	  is	  not	  mere	  common	  sense	  and	  is	  integrated	  with	  agency	  and	  action	  in	  appropriate	  ways.	  	  Two-­‐fold	  theories	  like	  Aristotle’s	  distinguish	  between	  theoretical	  wisdom	  (sophia)	  and	  practical	  wisdom	  	  (phronesis).	  	  Theoretical	  wisdom,	  the	  highest	  epistemic	  achievement,	  will	  be	  some	  form	  of	  episteme	  grounded	  in	  nous.	  Practical	  wisdom	  involves	  good	  practical	  reasoning,	  general	  knowledge	  of	  what	  ends	  are	  best	  to	  pursue	  and	  the	  best	  available	  means	  to	  achieve	  them.	  Our	  interest	  in	  wisdom	  per	  se	  will	  have	  to	  be	  selective,	  as	  we	  want	  to	  move	  to	  the	  issue	  of	  collective	  wisdom,	  but	  it	  will	  be	  helpful	  to	  have	  in	  mind	  some	  constitutive	  features	  of	  wisdom	  in	  general	  that	  have	  come	  in	  for	  recent	  discussion.	  	  Wisdom	  admits	  of	  two	  distinctions	  I	  will	  briefly	  explore	  here.	  	  First,	  accounts	  of	  wisdom	  throughout	  history	  of	  philosophy	  typically	  contain	  a	  cognitive	  and	  volitional	  element.	  	  For	  our	  purposes	  here,	  let	  us	  say	  that	  wisdom	  is	  a	  form	  of	  knowledge	  or	  understanding	  (and	  thus	  involves	  a	  cognitive	  achievement)	  such	  that:	  	  	  	   (1)	  the	  content	  of	  that	  knowledge	  is	  not	  mere	  common	  sense	  or	  species	  knowledge	  and	  is	  thus	  an	  achievement	  (2)	  the	  content	  of	  that	  knowledge	  involves	  an	  understanding	  of	  the	  best	  aims	  for	  the	  relevant	  	  agent	  to	  purse	  (individual	  or	  collective	  agent)	  and	  this	  is	  understood	  in	  a	  purely	  internal	  sense	  of	  ‘best	  aims’	  	  (3)	  the	  content	  of	  the	  understanding	  	  enables	  an	  agent	  to	  avoid	  many	  problems	  and	  predicaments	  that	  beset	  human	  beings	  if	  acted	  upon	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  Ryan	  refines	  this	  account	  in	  later	  essays,	  but	  these	  will	  not	  be	  a	  focus	  of	  the	  current	  
(4)	  the	  knowledge	  or	  understanding	  is	  acted	  upon	  at	  the	  relevant	  time,	  or	  at	  least	  gives	  an	  agent	  compelling	  reason	  for	  action;	  the	  wise	  person	  must	  thus	  have	  an	  excellence	  of	  agency	  or	  will	  to	  some	  extent2.	  	  	  	  My	  interest	  in	  the	  remainder	  of	  this	  essay	  is	  to	  determine	  whether	  and	  in	  what	  ways	  collectives	  can	  satisfy	  these	  conditions,	  or	  other	  reasonable	  conceptions	  of	  wisdom	  not	  addressed	  above.	  	  	  I	  will	  be	  equally	  interested	  to	  see	  how	  individual	  epistemic	  virtues	  function	  in	  accounts	  of	  collective	  wisdom.	  	  I	  argue	  that,	  in	  an	  important	  range	  of	  cases,	  individual	  epistemic	  virtues	  are	  essential	  for	  achieving	  collective	  wisdom,	  and	  this	  has	  normative	  implications	  for	  educational	  policy	  and	  social	  philosophy	  more	  broadly.	  	  
3.	  	  List	  on	  Group	  Agents	  and	  	  Thin	  Collective	  Wisdom	  As	  a	  backlash	  to	  the	  extreme	  individualism	  of	  Popper	  and	  Hayek	  who	  insisted	  that	  all	  social	  phenomena	  should	  be	  understood	  as	  resulting	  from	  the	  decisions,	  actions,	  and	  attitudes	  of	  individuals,	  andthat	  	  we	  should	  never	  be	  satisfied	  by	  an	  explanation	  in	  terms	  of	  so-­‐called	  “collectives”	  (Popper	  1945:	  91),	  recent	  analytic	  social	  philosophy	  has	  witnessed	  a	  significant	  resurgence	  of	  theories	  of	  joint	  action,	  collective	  intentionality	  and	  social	  ontology,	  including	  accounts	  of	  ‘we-­‐modes’	  by	  Toumela	  (2006),	  ‘shared	  agency’	  from	  Bratman	  (2009),	  Institutional	  facts	  (Searle	  2011),	  plural	  subjects	  (Gilbert	  1992)	  and	  collectives	  (Copp	  2007),	  Fricker	  (2010)	  and	  Anderson	  (2007).	  	  These	  are	  all	  inquiries	  into	  group	  agency	  and	  collective	  
judgements,	  the	  beliefs	  and	  actions	  of	  collective	  subjects.	  	  It	  is	  commonly	  said	  that	  epistemology	  took	  a	  turn	  to	  the	  agent	  with	  virtue	  epistemology,	  and	  that	  agent	  now	  appears	  to	  be	  going	  social,	  plural	  and	  collective.	  	  	  	  One	  particularly	  influential	  account	  is	  from	  Petit	  and	  List	  (2011),	  according	  to	  whom	  some	  social	  groups	  are	  “rational	  agents	  in	  their	  own	  right”,	  capable	  of	  forming	  beliefs	  according	  to	  a	  some	  process	  that	  aggregates	  individual	  epistemic	  states	  to	  determine	  collective	  epistemic	  states.	  	  	  To	  fix	  ideas,	  we	  can	  clearly	  distinguish	  a	  group	  of	  individuals	  that	  constitute	  a	  housing	  board	  from	  a	  group	  of	  individuals	  that	  constitute	  a	  crowd	  waiting	  for	  a	  bus.	  	  The	  individual	  members	  of	  the	  housing	  board	  collectively	  constitute	  an	  entity	  capable	  of	  forming	  judgements	  (“Smith	  must	  compensate	  Jones	  for	  the	  damage”)	  and	  performing	  actions	  (sending	  Smith	  the	  formal	  assessment	  of	  charges).	  	  A	  crowd	  waiting	  for	  the	  bus,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  is	  not	  a	  collective	  agent	  in	  any	  meaningful	  sense,	  it	  is	  just	  a	  crowd.	  	  However,	  as	  Petit	  and	  List	  have	  shown,	  it	  is	  surprisingly	  difficult	  to	  aggregate	  the	  beliefs	  of	  individual	  group	  members	  in	  ways	  that	  constitute	  a	  rational	  collective	  agent.	  	  More	  on	  this	  below.	  	  To	  get	  started,	  Petit	  and	  List	  require	  that	  any	  collective	  agent	  must	  possess:	  	  	  1. representational	  states	  that	  depict	  how	  things	  are	  in	  the	  environment.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  2	  There	  is	  no	  reason	  to	  think	  that	  a	  wise	  person	  must	  be	  non-­‐akratic	  or	  continent	  in	  all	  or	  even	  most	  actions,	  since	  many	  actions	  are	  quite	  trivial	  and	  do	  not	  pertain	  to	  the	  important	  aims	  of	  life	  in	  any	  way.	  	  
2. motivational	  states	  that	  specify	  how	  it	  requires	  things	  to	  be	  in	  the	  environment.	  3.	  	   the	  capacity	  to	  process	  its	  representational	  and	  motivational	  states,	  leading	  it	  to	  intervene	  in	  the	  environment	  whenever	  that	  environment	  fails	  to	  match	  a	  motivating	  specification.	  	  A	  mere	  crowd	  does	  not	  possess	  these	  features,	  and	  genuine	  collectives	  will	  typically	  manifest	  them	  by	  exhibiting	  	  appropriate	  forms	  of	  integration	  between	  the	  cognitive	  states	  of	  its	  individual	  members,	  and	  this	  will	  be	  achieved	  through	  an	  organizational	  structure	  that	  include	  aggregation	  procedures.	  	  List	  says	  aggregation	  procedures	  “may	  take	  the	  form	  of	  a	  voting	  procedure,	  a	  deliberation	  protocol,	  or	  any	  other	  mechanism	  by	  which	  the	  group	  can	  make	  joint	  declarations	  or	  deliver	  a	  joint	  report.	  Such	  procedures	  are	  in	  operation	  in	  expert	  panels,	  multi-­‐	  member	  courts,	  policy	  advisory	  committees	  and	  groups	  of	  scientific	  collaborators”	  (List	  2008).	  	  An	  
aggregation	  procedure	  is	  a	  function	  which	  assigns	  to	  each	  combination	  of	  the	  group	  members’	  individual	  ‘acceptance/rejection’	  judgments	  on	  the	  propositions	  on	  the	  agenda	  corresponding	  a	  set	  of	  collective	  judgments.	  	  A	  simple	  and	  widespread	  example	  of	  an	  aggregation	  procedure	  is	  majority	  voting,	  “whereby	  a	  group	  judges	  a	  given	  proposition	  to	  be	  true	  whenever	  a	  majority	  of	  group	  members	  does	  so”	  (List	  2008).	  	  	  While	  majority	  voting	  aggregation	  procedures	  will	  face	  extreme	  difficulties	  in	  meeting	  norms	  of	  rationality	  noted	  below,	  we	  use	  this	  procedure	  for	  aggregating	  the	  beliefs	  of	  individual	  group	  members	  to	  easily	  attribute	  representational	  states	  (including	  beliefs	  about	  other	  collective	  agents),	  dispositions	  to	  act	  on	  its	  representational	  states,	  and	  interests	  and	  aims	  to	  group	  agents.	  Without	  introducing	  any	  spooky	  entities,	  we	  can	  say	  that	  under	  certain	  conditions	  a	  group	  of	  individual	  agents	  will	  constitute	  a	  group	  agent	  in	  its	  own	  right.	  The	  fundamental	  barrier	  to	  collective	  wisdom	  as	  List	  sees	  it	  comes	  from	  the	  
discursive	  dilemma	  and	  similar	  results,	  which	  show	  how	  easily	  group	  agents	  can	  become	  inconsistent.	  	  Rampant	  inconsistency	  does	  not	  appear	  to	  be	  the	  mark	  of	  a	  wise	  agent,	  collective	  or	  individual3.	  Below	  is	  a	  simple	  example	  of	  the	  kind	  of	  problematic	  case	  involving	  a	  three-­‐person	  tenure	  committee.	  	  
The tenure example. A university committee has to decide whether to give tenure to a junior 
academic (the outcome or conclusion). The requirement for tenure is excellence in both teaching 
and research (the two reasons or premises). The first among three committee members thinks the 
candidate is excellent in teaching but not in research; the second thinks she is excellent in research 
but not in teaching; the third thinks she is excellent in both. So a majority considers the candidate 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  3	  While	  this	  is	  intuitive,	  it	  is	  far	  from	  obvious	  that	  a	  wise	  agent	  needs	  to	  be	  consistent.	  At	  most,	  a	  wise	  agent	  would	  need	  to	  be	  consistent	  with	  respect	  to	  those	  propositions	  relevant	  to	  living	  well.	  	  I	  briefly	  consider	  further	  reasons	  to	  question	  whether	  wise	  agents	  must	  be	  consistent.	  	  	  
excellent in teaching, a majority considers her excellent in research, but only a minority – the third 
committee member – thinks the candidate should be given tenure. How should the committee 
decide? 	  The	  committee	  believes	  that	  the	  candidate	  has	  satisfied	  the	  requirement	  for	  tenure	  (excellent	  teaching,	  excellent	  research),	  but	  does	  not	  believe	  the	  candidate	  should	  be	  given	  tenure.	  	  Similar	  results	  are	  generated	  for	  a	  three	  person	  expert	  advisory	  
committee	  that	  judges	  on	  the	  following	  propositions:	  (a)There	  will	  be	  significant	  global	  warming	  (the	  conclusion).	  (b)	  greenhouse	  gas	  emissions	  are	  above	  some	  critical	  threshold	  (the	  first	  premise);	  and	  (c)	  	  if	  greenhouse	  gas	  emissions	  are	  above	  the	  given	  threshold,	  then	  there	  will	  be	  significant	  global	  warming	  (the	  second	  
premise).	  	  Given	  a	  similar	  set	  of	  individual	  judgments	  as	  in	  the	  tenure	  case	  above,	  a	  three	  person	  expert	  panel	  can	  easily	  believe	  (b)	  and	  (c)	  but	  not	  (a).	  	  	  These	  results	  show	  that	  collectives	  often	  refuse	  to	  honor	  principles	  of	  rationality	  as	  basic	  as	  modus	  ponens,	  and	  Petit	  and	  List	  have	  generalized	  these	  results	  to	  a	  wide	  range	  of	  aggregation	  procedures	  beyond	  majority	  voting.	  	  	  The	  discursive	  dilemma	  and	  similar	  results	  show	  that	  majority	  voting	  aggregation	  procedures	  do	  not	  ensure	  consistent	  collective	  judgments.	  	  We	  can	  thus	  say	  that	  meeting	  the	  following	  coherence	  challenge	  will	  constitute	  a	  collective	  epistemic	  achievement:	  a	  group	  aiming	  to	  form	  collective	  judgments	  on	  some	  agenda	  of	  propositions	  must	  ensure	  the	  coherence	  of	  its	  collective	  judgments.	  	  In	  response	  to	  these	  and	  similar	  failures	  of	  collective	  rationality,	  List	  opens	  “the	  logical	  space	  of	  possible	  aggregation	  functions	  more	  generally”,	  and	  considers	  a	  range	  of	  different	  procedures	  for	  aggregating	  individual	  epistemic	  states	  (Dictatorships,	  Reverse	  Dictatorships,	  Premise	  Approaches,	  Conclusion	  Approaches,	  Distributed	  Premise	  Approaches)	  that	  each	  avoid	  some	  range	  of	  impossibility	  results,	  and	  gradually	  shows	  how	  a	  basically	  rational	  collective	  agent	  emerges	  in	  virtue	  of	  suitable	  adjustments	  to	  its	  aggregation	  functions.	  	  	   An	  important	  result	  for	  our	  purposes	  is	  that	  List	  and	  Dietrich	  (2008)	  show	  	  that	  certain	  desirable	  formal	  properties	  of	  aggregation	  procedures	  can	  only	  be	  achieved	  if	  it	  is	  a	  dictatorship	  or	  reverse	  dictatorship	  (e.g.,	  ruled	  by	  a	  chairperson	  or	  in	  receivership).	  	  	  	  Collective	  wisdom	  thus	  threatens	  to	  collapse	  into	  the	  wisdom	  of	  a	  specific	  individual,	  and	  is	  thus	  not	  collective	  in	  any	  interesting	  sense.	  	  However,	  List	  argues	  that	  these	  worrisome	  results	  about	  collective	  irrationality	  only	  follow	  if	  we	  require	  that	  collective	  agents	  satisfy	  rigid	  forms	  of	  the	  desiderata	  Universality	  (aggregation	  functions	  that	  take	  any	  consistent	  and	  complete	  set	  of	  individual	  judgemements),	  Decisiveness	  (aggregation	  functions	  that	  produce	  complete	  judgements	  on	  all	  propositions),	  Systematicity	  (collective	  judgements	  depend	  only	  on	  individual	  judgements	  and	  patterns	  of	  dependence).	  	  List	  argues	  that	  we	  can	  attain	  meaningfully	  collective	  wisdom	  (not	  just	  dictatorial	  wisdom)	  only	  if	  we	  “relax”	  either	  Universality,	  Decisiveness,	  or	  Systematicity.	  	  Thus,	  a	  wise	  collective	  agent	  will	  see	  that	  it	  must	  give	  up	  either	  strict	  universality,	  strict	  decisiveness,	  or	  strict	  systematicity.	  	  	  
	  One	  way	  of	  relaxing	  systematicity	  is	  to	  have	  individual	  members	  make	  judgements	  only	  on	  premises,	  not	  conclusions.	  	  However,	  this	  does	  not	  work	  well	  for	  preserving	  consistency	  and	  closure,	  and	  can	  also	  lead	  to	  ‘faking’	  premise	  beliefs	  in	  order	  to	  produce	  the	  intended	  conclusion	  belief	  for	  the	  collective,	  rather	  than	  those	  that	  would	  naturally	  be	  produced	  by	  the	  aggregation	  function.	  	  A	  collective	  can	  relax	  
decisiveness	  by	  allowing	  “supermajority”	  rules	  or	  other	  ways	  of	  allowing	  a	  collective	  to	  refrain	  from	  passing	  judgment	  if	  certain	  patterns	  do	  not	  emerge	  in	  the	  aggregation	  of	  individual	  judgements.	  	  Relaxing	  universality	  involves	  having	  things	  like	  ‘expert’	  subgroups	  that	  are	  considered	  authoritative	  on	  specific	  agenda	  items	  and	  thus	  work	  only	  on	  certain	  premises	  in	  collective	  reasoning.	  	  Also,	  we	  break	  down	  large	  collective	  tasks	  into	  many	  smaller	  tasks,	  which	  are	  distributed	  to	  specific	  subgroups	  of	  the	  collective	  selected	  for	  aggregation	  on	  a	  specific	  proposition.	  	  	  List’s	  ‘thin’	  account	  is	  a	  real	  form	  of	  wisdom;	  a	  wise	  collective	  has	  the	  ability	  to	  achieve	  an	  important	  collective	  aim	  amidst	  a	  number	  of	  serious	  problems	  endemic	  to	  being	  a	  collective	  agent,	  and	  does	  so	  by	  implementing	  appropriately	  virtuous	  aggregation	  procedures.	  	  	  Since	  this	  turns	  out	  to	  be	  difficult	  for	  a	  collective	  to	  achieve,	  and	  is	  necessary	  for	  being	  a	  basically	  rational	  collective,	  collectives	  that	  meet	  the	  coherence	  challenge	  can	  be	  credited	  with	  a	  kind	  of	  wisdom,	  at	  least	  relative	  to	  the	  aim	  of	  being	  a	  basically	  rational	  collective	  agent.	  	  However,	  as	  List	  himself	  recognizes,	  possessing	  a	  virtuous	  aggregation	  procedure	  is	  not	  sufficient	  for	  wisdom	  as	  traditionally	  conceived	  (clearly	  in	  the	  individual	  case	  we	  would	  not	  say	  that	  the	  wise	  person	  is	  the	  merely	  consistent	  person).	  Nonetheless,	  List	  shows	  how	  virtuous	  aggregation	  functions	  are	  necessary	  to	  avoid	  incoherence	  worries	  that	  otherwise	  plague	  collective	  agents,	  and	  this	  gives	  us	  one	  way	  in	  which	  some	  collectives	  might	  properly	  be	  seen	  as	  wiser	  than	  others.	  	  Before	  moving	  to	  thicker	  accounts	  of	  collective	  wisdom,	  it	  is	  worth	  noting	  that	  List’s	  collective	  wisdom	  might	  bear	  some	  interesting	  relations	  to	  individual	  epistemic	  
virtues,	  and	  to	  virtue	  epistemology	  generally.	  	  In	  particular,	  thinly	  wise	  collectives	  might	  be	  a	  source	  of	  epistemic	  authority	  (e.g.,	  through	  collective	  testimony)	  for	  (individually)	  intellectually	  virtuous	  persons.	  If	  List	  is	  able	  to	  restore	  coherence	  to	  collective	  judgments	  and	  Condorcet	  style	  arguments	  show	  that	  appropriately	  organized	  collectives	  will	  more	  reliably	  get	  to	  the	  truth,	  epistemically	  virtuous	  individuals	  should	  be	  sensitive	  to	  collective	  testimony	  in	  forming	  and	  sustaining	  their	  own	  beliefs.	  	  Since	  List	  also	  shows	  that	  collectives	  with	  poor	  aggregation	  functions	  can	  easily	  become	  irrational,	  individual	  competence	  in	  distinguishing	  (thinly)	  wise	  from	  unwise	  collectives	  will	  be	  an	  individual	  epistemic	  virtue	  that	  emerges	  from	  List’s	  account.	  	  There	  do	  not	  appear	  to	  be	  additional	  practical	  implications	  to	  List’s	  account	  beyond	  sage	  advice	  for	  organizational	  design,	  which	  in	  cases	  like	  voting	  procedures	  will	  indeed	  be	  very	  important.	  	  	  	  	  	  
	  	  
4.	  	  Fricker’s	  Practical	  Identities	  and	  Institutional	  Virtues	  	  In	  “Can	  There	  Be	  Institutional	  Virtues?”	  (2011),	  Miranda	  Fricker	  distinguishes	  three	  ways	  of	  relating	  groups	  to	  their	  constituent	  members.	  	  A	  group	  may	  be	  any	  of	  the	  following:	  	  (1)	  A	  number	  of	  individuals	  -­‐	  the	  group	  considered	  as	  the	  sum	  of	  its	  component	  	  	  	  individuals	  	  (2)	  A	  collective	  -­‐	  the	  group	  considered	  as	  non-­‐reducible	  to	  its	  component	  individuals	  	  (3)	  An	  institutional	  structure	  -­‐its	  formal	  and	  procedural	  structure	  	  When	  a	  person	  says	  “The	  jury	  was	  fair-­‐minded”,	  she	  might	  “be	  saying	  (1)	  that	  enough	  of	  the	  individual	  jurors	  displayed	  fair-­‐mindedness”,	  or	  she	  might	  “be	  saying	  (2)	  that	  the	  jury	  taken	  collectively	  displayed	  fair-­‐mindedness.”	  Or,	  we	  add	  that	  (3)	  "The	  jury	  is	  a	  just	  system”	  which	  is	  about	  the	  jury	  as	  an	  institutional	  structure	  	  (Fricker,	  ibid.)	  	  Fricker	  is	  not	  interested	  in	  merely	  summative	  accounts	  of	  groups,	  but	  only	  in	  the	  second	  and	  third	  sense	  above.	  	  List	  appears	  to	  be	  only	  interested	  in	  groups	  as	  (3)	  has	  it	  above,	  as	  defined	  largely	  by	  their	  aggregation	  function.	  	  Properties	  like	  fair-­‐mindedness	  and	  tenacity	  primarily	  apply	  to	  a	  jury	  or	  committee	  only	  in	  the	  sense	  of	  (1)	  or	  (2),	  but	  (1)	  is	  not	  interesting	  for	  our	  purposes	  here.	  I	  do	  not	  want	  to	  rule	  out	  that	  such	  properties	  could	  be	  attributed	  to	  a	  collective	  in	  virtue	  of	  its	  aggregation	  procedures	  or	  institutional	  structure	  (i.e.	  3	  above),	  but	  List	  also	  seems	  to	  see	  these	  as	  importantly	  different	  (thick)	  collective	  properties.	  	  	  Thus,	  “the	  fair	  mindedness	  of	  the	  jury”	  should	  be	  understood	  in	  terms	  of	  (2),	  where	  we	  understand	  this	  as	  follows:	  	  a	  collective	  is	  not	  reducible	  to	  its	  component	  individuals	  
or	  it’s	  aggregations	  procedures.	  	  We	  can	  say	  that	  the	  actions	  of	  any	  specific	  collective	  
manifest	  its	  institutional	  structure,	  but	  we	  will	  have	  to	  bring	  in	  additional	  explanatory	  devices	  to	  account	  for	  institutional	  virtues	  and	  vices.	  	  Of	  interest	  for	  our	  purposes	  will	  be	  the	  account	  of	  ‘an	  individual	  acting	  under	  a	  practical	  identity’	  that	  Fricker	  uses	  to	  explain	  institutional	  virtues	  and	  vices.	  	  	  Summativism	  (1	  above)	  fails	  to	  account	  for	  a	  number	  of	  cases	  where	  individual	  possession	  of	  a	  property	  is	  neither	  necessary	  nor	  sufficient	  for	  group	  possession.	  “Summativism	  does	  not	  work	  as	  a	  general	  account	  of	  group	  features,	  for	  there	  can	  be	  cases	  where	  a	  group	  possesses	  a	  feature	  that	  few	  or	  even	  none	  of	  its	  component	  individuals	  possess	  (so	  individual	  possession	  of	  the	  feature	  is	  not	  necessary);	  and	  there	  can	  be	  cases	  where	  the	  group	  lacks	  a	  feature	  even	  though	  it	  is	  possessed	  by	  many	  or	  even	  all	  of	  the	  component	  individuals	  (so	  individual	  possession	  of	  the	  feature	  is	  not	  sufficient)”.	  	  Borrowing	  a	  fine	  example	  from	  Reza	  Lahroodi	  showing	  the	  effect	  of	  the	  contextual	  pressures	  imagining	  an	  administrative	  church	  committee	  
made	  up	  of	  individual	  members	  who	  are	  each	  open-­‐minded	  about	  gay	  rights.	  But	  unfortunately	  when	  they	  get	  together	  in	  the	  context	  of	  the	  church	  committee	  a	  certain	  closed-­‐mindedness	  comes	  over	  them,	  perhaps	  because	  they	  “want	  others	  to	  think	  they	  are	  towing	  [sic]	  the	  church	  line	  on	  this	  issue.	  They	  may	  clam	  up	  in	  the	  presence	  of	  other	  members	  if	  they	  anticipate	  negative	  reaction	  by	  powerful	  authorities	  outside	  the	  group”.	  	  Similar	  things	  might	  be	  said	  of	  the	  “competitiveness”	  of	  a	  team	  which	  does	  not	  have	  particularly	  competitive	  individuals	  members.	  	  	  In	  Lahroodi’s	  example	  and	  the	  tenacious	  team	  member	  (who	  is	  otherwise	  timid),	  the	  attributability	  of	  a	  virtue	  to	  an	  individual	  depends	  on	  whether	  the	  individual	  is	  acting	  as	  a	  church	  committee	  member	  (or	  team	  member)	  or	  in	  some	  other	  capacity.	  We	  can	  easily	  describe	  cases	  of	  open-­‐minded	  individual	  group	  members	  that	  do	  not	  constitute	  an	  open	  minded	  collective,	  so	  reductive	  accounts	  of	  group	  properties	  are	  not	  promising.	  	  	  Fricker	  accounts	  for	  these	  collective	  properties	  through	  an	  intermediate	  category	  of	  action	  under	  a	  practical	  identity,	  	  which	  is	  neither	  an	  entirely	  collective	  property	  (like	  features	  of	  aggregation	  functions)	  nor	  entirely	  individual	  properties	  (since	  they	  are	  often	  not	  true	  of	  individuals	  qua	  individual	  or	  when	  acting	  in	  other	  capacities).	  	  	  “A	  more	  decisive	  style	  of	  counterexample	  to	  summativism	  will	  not,	  I	  sug-­‐	  gest,	  turn	  on	  quite	  such	  a	  contingent	  type	  of	  influence	  as	  this	  normative	  and	  psychologically	  structured	  influence	  that	  a	  subject’s	  various	  ‘practical	  identities’	  have	  on	  what	  features	  and	  attributes	  she	  is	  committed	  to	  displaying.	  The	  mere	  fact	  that	  social	  subjects	  have	  a	  range	  of	  practical	  identities	  (so	  that	  one	  may	  confront	  a	  situation,	  decision,	  or	  choice	  as	  a	  professional,	  as	  a	  
parent,	  as	  a	  friend,	  as	  a	  gay	  man,	  as	  a	  Christian,	  as	  an	  interested	  or	  disinterested	  party,	  and	  so	  on)	  means	  that	  there	  can	  be	  tension,	  and	  sometimes	  downright	  conflict,	  between	  the	  commitments	  associated	  with	  different	  practical	  identities	  of	  the	  same	  person.	  This	  in	  turn	  generates	  the	  possibility	  of	  that	  individual	  having	  a	  certain	  attribute	  only	  as	  a	  group	  member	  and	  not	  as	  a	  private	  individual.”	  (ibid,	  my	  italics)	  To	  account	  for	  this	  tension	  and	  conflict	  between	  practical	  identities,	  Fricker	  distinguishes	  between	  properties	  that	  an	  individual	  might	  have	  as	  a	  group	  member	  and	  properties	  they	  have	  as	  a	  private	  individual.	  	  Lahroodi’s	  administrative	  church	  committee	  and	  Fricker’s	  competitive	  team	  members	  show	  that	  (a)	  collectives	  can	  have	  properties	  lacked	  by	  each	  of	  its	  members	  qua	  private	  individual	  and	  (b)	  that	  every	  member	  of	  a	  group	  possessing	  a	  feature	  is	  insufficient	  for	  the	  group	  to	  possess	  it	  (e.g.,	  being	  open	  minded	  about	  gay	  rights).	  Fricker	  concludes	  that	  “Some	  practical	  identities	  of	  individuals	  are	  thus	  intrinsically	  group-­‐involving,	  and	  in	  such	  cases	  there	  is	  no	  lower	  level	  of	  group-­‐independent	  features	  to	  which	  the	  higher-­‐level	  features	  can	  be	  reduced.	  Any	  attempted	  reduction	  of	  the	  group	  to	  a	  sum	  of	  uncommitted	  non-­‐group-­‐identified	  individuals	  would	  literally	  change	  the	  subject,	  and	  so	  fail.”	  	  This	  gives	  us	  one	  important	  sense	  of	  group	  agency	  that	  nonetheless	  foregrounds	  the	  individual.	  	  When	  an	  agent	  performs	  an	  action	  under	  an	  essentially	  group-­‐involving	  practical	  identity,	  the	  collective	  has	  done	  something,	  but	  has	  done	  so	  only	  because	  a	  full	  individual	  action	  was	  performed.	  	  Fricker	  argues	  that	  not	  only	  these	  kinds	  of	  institutional	  actions,	  and	  the	  institutions	  themselves,	  can	  instantiate	  thick	  collective	  
properties	  like	  virtues	  and	  vices.	  	  Our	  question	  is	  whether	  individual	  actions	  under	  a	  collective	  identity	  can	  be	  wise	  collective	  actions,	  where	  this	  is	  now	  a	  question	  of	  whether	  they	  can	  be	  thickly	  wise4.	  	   Taking	  stock,	  Fricker	  argues	  that	  institutions	  can	  be	  properly	  said	  to	  possess	  virtues	  and	  vices;	  the	  institutional	  racism	  of	  the	  police	  force,	  open	  mindedness	  of	  the	  jury,	  tenaciousness	  of	  the	  research	  team.	  	  Moreover,	  she	  argues	  that	  collectives	  can	  have	  these	  virtues	  both	  in	  a	  “motivationally	  demanding	  way”	  (Aristotelian	  virtues)	  or	  as	  a	  sheer	  excellence	  or	  skill	  (Stoic	  virtues.)	  This	  is	  potentially	  attractive	  here	  because	  List	  was	  only	  able	  to	  provide	  a	  thin	  conception	  of	  collective	  wisdom	  (perhaps	  closer	  to	  a	  ‘sheer	  excellence’	  or	  skill	  of	  the	  collective).	  	  If	  we	  use	  Fricker’s	  account	  of	  individual	  actions	  under	  a	  practical	  identity	  and	  we	  agree	  that	  these	  actions	  (a)	  are	  sufficiently	  actions	  of	  the	  collective	  (b)	  promote	  important	  aims	  of	  the	  collective	  and	  (c)	  can	  be	  acted	  upon	  or	  give	  the	  collective	  a	  compelling	  reason	  for	  action,	  then	  we	  can	  clearly	  see	  how	  an	  individual	  action	  under	  a	  practical	  identity	  can	  constitute	  a	  wise	  collective	  action.	  	  	  Drawing	  on	  Fricker’s	  account,	  in	  the	  next	  section	  I	  defend	  an	  account	  of	  thick	  collective	  wisdom,	  and	  will	  then	  argue	  that	  important	  policy	  implications	  arise	  from	  properly	  understanding	  thick	  collective	  wisdom	  because	  of	  the	  essential	  role	  played	  by	  individual	  intellectual	  and	  moral	  virtues	  (usually	  virtues	  other	  than	  wisdom).	  	  List’s	  account	  of	  thin	  collective	  wisdom	  is	  also	  thinner	  in	  practical	  implications.	  	  Since	  wisdom	  is	  a	  practical	  value,	  it	  will	  count	  in	  favor	  my	  account	  if	  policy	  makers	  receive	  greater	  guidance	  from	  the	  thick	  account	  of	  collective	  wisdom	  defended	  below	  compared	  to	  List’s	  thin	  account	  which	  is	  directly	  relevant	  to	  institutional	  design	  and	  formal	  structures	  like	  aggregation	  procedures.	  	  	  	  
5.	  	  Thick	  collective	  wisdom.	  	  Most	  of	  us	  are	  familiar	  with	  “best	  practice”	  sessions	  which	  often	  seek	  to	  improve	  upon	  current	  normal	  expectations	  for	  a	  practical	  identity	  by	  integrating	  the	  non-­‐obvious	  successes	  of	  the	  best	  performing	  individuals	  under	  that	  practical	  identity.	  	  Practitioners	  often	  seek	  to	  further	  our	  understanding	  of	  and	  to	  reliably	  reproduce	  outstanding	  individual	  performances	  by	  incorporating	  them	  into	  updated	  role	  specific	  expectations.	  	  In	  this	  way,	  institutions	  regularly	  seek	  to	  “wise	  up”.	  	  The	  outcomes	  that	  best	  practice	  session	  aim	  for	  appear	  to	  be	  increased	  thin	  collective	  wisdom,	  since	  the	  improvement	  to	  current	  normal	  expectations	  is	  the	  goal.	  	  	  The	  institutional	  structure	  is	  the	  primary	  bearer	  of	  wisdom	  here,	  so	  I	  call	  this	  
Institutionalized	  Wisdom,	  which	  also	  appears	  to	  be	  what	  List	  has	  in	  mind.	  This	  is	  one	  way	  for	  an	  institution	  to	  become	  wiser,	  but	  we	  need	  to	  recognize	  that	  the	  input	  used	  
to	  arrive	  at	  institutionalized	  wisdom	  is	  often	  itself	  a	  different	  form	  of	  collective	  
wisdom.	  While	  we	  can	  praise	  or	  admire	  a	  collective	  action	  for	  the	  fact	  that	  it	  manifests	  a	  wise	  aggregation	  procedure,	  this	  will	  only	  give	  praise	  to	  collective	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  4	  the	  group	  considered	  as	  non-­‐reducible	  to	  its	  component	  individuals	  	  	  
actions	  that	  can	  be	  performed	  simply	  in	  virtue	  of	  the	  organizational	  structure	  of	  the	  collective.	  	  We	  might	  capture	  this	  with	  the	  concept	  of	  basic	  competence	  under	  a	  practical	  identity:	  an	  action	  of	  an	  individual	  that	  merely	  carries	  out	  normal	  
expectations	  of	  an	  individual	  acting	  under	  that	  practical	  identity	  is	  a	  basically	  
competent	  action	  under	  a	  collective	  identity.	  	  However,	  real	  world	  collective	  actions	  that	  aspire	  to	  skillfully	  use	  a	  wise	  aggregation	  procedure	  and	  simultaneously	  negotiate	  a	  complex	  and	  unpredictable	  environment	  in	  pursuit	  of	  important	  goals	  will	  often	  require	  more	  than	  basic	  competence	  amongst	  the	  individual	  members.	  	  Guidance	  norms	  forthcoming	  by	  List’s	  wise	  aggregation	  procedures	  will	  no	  doubt	  
underdetermine	  a	  wide	  range	  of	  day	  to	  day	  collective	  judgements	  and	  actions.	  	  Even	  the	  best	  guidance	  norms	  will	  underdetermine	  a	  wide	  range	  of	  collective	  decisions	  when	  these	  norms	  are	  strictly	  a	  function	  of	  meeting	  role	  specific	  expectations	  or	  implementing	  an	  aggregation	  procedure.	  	  When	  working	  outside	  aggregation	  procedures	  and	  normal	  expectations,	  the	  collective	  must	  now	  rely	  on	  	  the	  abilities	  of	  individual	  members	  to	  resolve	  dilemmas,	  underdetermination	  problems	  and	  a	  host	  of	  what	  we	  might	  call	  manifestion	  challenges	  facing	  even	  a	  thinly	  wise	  collective.	  	  	  This	  is	  not	  to	  deny	  that	  some	  collective	  actions	  can	  be	  considered	  wise	  simply	  by	  virtue	  of	  the	  organizational	  structure	  or	  aggregations	  procedures.	  	  	  	  The	  fact	  that	  a	  certain	  individual	  action	  under	  a	  practical	  identity	  counts	  as	  a	  certain	  kind	  of	  
contribution	  to	  forming	  a	  collective	  judgment,	  where	  this	  collective	  judgement	  is	  also	  
sufficiently	  rational	  to	  count	  as	  an	  achievement,	  the	  collective	  action	  is	  praised	  because	  of	  its	  particular	  aggregation	  function	  more	  than	  anything	  an	  individual	  member	  has	  done	  (outside	  of	  meeting	  normal	  expectations).	  	  An	  individual	  casting	  a	  vote	  in	  an	  election	  where	  the	  voting	  structures	  have	  been	  modified	  to	  avoid	  discursive	  dilemma	  problems	  would	  be	  a	  case	  in	  hand.	  	  	  	  Any	  item	  of	  valuable	  collective	  understanding	  (including	  items	  of	  thin	  collective	  wisdoms)	  per	  se	  will	  be	  more	  valuable	  if	  it	  is	  appropriately	  action	  guiding	  or	  gives	  reasons	  for	  action	  to	  the	  agent.	  	  Following	  Fricker,	  we	  will	  say	  this	  thicker5	  form	  of	  wisdom	  will	  be	  manifested	  by	  an	  individual	  acting	  in	  an	  institutional	  capacity	  where	  this	  action	  constitutes	  a	  non-­‐obvious	  role	  specific	  decision	  that	  promotes	  some	  
important	  aim	  of	  the	  collective.	  	  The	  action	  or	  decision	  need	  not	  promote	  the	  aims	  of	  the	  individual	  (qua	  individual),	  so	  it	  cannot	  be	  assumed	  that	  thick	  collective	  wisdom	  coincides	  with	  individual	  wisdom.	  	  However,	  the	  non-­‐obviousness	  of	  the	  action	  is	  intended	  here	  to	  suggest	  that	  there	  are	  nonetheless	  individual	  virtues	  other	  than	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  5	  The	  distinction	  between	  thick	  and	  thin	  properties	  is	  made	  in	  various	  ways	  by	  different	  philosophers.	  	  See	  Ecklund	  for	  an	  interesting	  discussion,	  and	  a	  suggestion	  to	  consider	  Foot’s	  (1958)	  remarks:	  “it	  expresses	  disapproval,	  is	  meant	  to	  be	  used	  when	  an	  action	  is	  to	  be	  discouraged,	  implies	  that	  other	  things	  being	  equal	  the	  behaviour	  to	  which	  it	  is	  applied	  will	  be	  avoided	  by	  the	  speaker,	  and	  so	  on”	  (1958,	  102).	  	  But	  see	  Williams,	  Smith	  and	  others	  for	  different	  ways	  of	  drawing	  the	  distinction.	  	  	  
wisdom	  that	  the	  individual	  (qua	  individual)	  manifests,	  and	  this	  is	  a	  point	  I	  want	  to	  build	  on.	  	  While	  the	  potential	  conflict	  with	  individual	  wisdom	  raises	  important	  issues,	  and	  I	  will	  hope	  to	  address	  them	  in	  the	  final	  section,	  the	  fact	  that	  other	  moral	  or	  intellectual	  virtues	  will	  regularly	  be	  needed	  for	  a	  collective	  to	  act	  wisely	  day	  in	  and	  day	  out	  cannot	  be	  overlooked.	  	  Whatever	  epistemic	  value	  individual	  intellectual	  (and	  moral)	  virtues	  might	  have,	  they	  have	  more	  value	  when	  they	  cause	  a	  collectively	  wise	  action	  that	  would	  not	  have	  occurred	  independent	  of	  the	  virtues	  of	  the	  individual	  member6.	  	  	  	  The	  individual	  actions	  we	  have	  in	  mind	  here	  will	  often	  include	  the	  very	  individual	  performances	  that	  Instituitonalized	  Wisdom	  and	  best	  practices	  sessions	  incorporate	  into	  the	  updated	  role	  specific	  expectations	  above.	  	  That	  is,	  thick	  collective	  wisdom	  will	  often	  be	  a	  ‘best	  practice’	  prior	  to	  being	  institutionalized.	  The	  primary	  subject	  of	  wisdom	  attributions	  here	  are	  individuals	  acting	  in	  an	  institutional	  capacity,	  but	  we	  saw	  above	  (from	  Fricker)	  that	  such	  properties	  do	  not	  reduce	  to	  properties	  of	  individuals	  qua	  individuals	  (see	  Lahroodi	  and	  Fricker),	  so	  they	  are	  not	  strictly	  individual	  properties.	  	  	  I	  argue	  that	  such	  actions	  constitute	  thick	  collective	  wisdom.	  	  Broadly	  speaking,	  they	  fills	  the	  gap	  between	  thinly	  wise	  aggregation	  functions	  and	  actual	  performances	  of	  wise	  collective	  actions	  	  The	  property	  is	  thicker	  than	  that	  considered	  by	  List	  because	  its	  description	  will	  invoke	  a	  range	  of	  deliberative,	  affective	  and	  agential	  capacities	  of	  individual	  agents	  acting	  in	  the	  world,	  not	  just	  a	  savy	  set	  of	  rules	  or	  procedures	  	  that	  predict	  good	  outcomes.	  	  	  One	  problem	  facing	  the	  account	  defended	  here	  is	  that	  thick	  collective	  wisdom	  is	  
risky,	  and	  institutions	  may	  therefore	  have	  reason	  to	  favor	  institutionalized	  wisdom	  whenever	  possible.	  	  Institutions	  would	  then	  seek	  to	  convert	  instances	  of	  thick	  collective	  wisdom	  into	  thin	  collective	  wisdom	  (perhaps	  through	  best	  practice	  session)	  as	  a	  risk	  avoidance	  strategy.	  	  Since	  achieving	  basic	  rationality	  for	  a	  collective	  is	  challenging	  in	  its	  own	  right,	  a	  prudent	  collective	  may	  be	  wary	  to	  expose	  itself	  to	  unnecessary	  risks	  once	  basic	  rationality	  is	  achieved.	  	  	  The	  more	  thin	  collective	  wisdom	  an	  institution	  has	  relevant	  to	  a	  certain	  aim,	  the	  less	  need	  it	  will	  have	  for	  thick	  collective	  wisdom.	  	  Institutional	  wisdom	  may	  therefore	  trend	  against	  allowing	  individual	  epistemic	  virtues	  to	  play	  a	  significant	  role	  in	  colletive	  actions.	  	  This	  presents	  a	  diminishing	  prospect	  for	  the	  individual	  in	  thick	  collective	  wisdom,	  and	  thus	  raises	  questions	  about	  the	  desirability	  of	  wise	  institutions7.	  	  Fortunately	  for	  the	  individual,	  the	  complexity,	  fragility	  and	  longevity	  of	  an	  institution	  makes	  it	  vulnerable	  to	  change	  and	  chance,	  and	  institutions	  are	  often	  slow	  and	  clunky	  in	  responding	  innovation,	  technological	  advances	  and	  changes	  in	  the	  social	  environment.	  I	  argue	  that	  this	  risk	  and	  uncertainty	  creates	  an	  ongoing	  need	  for	  thick	  collective	  wisdom	  even	  in	  the	  pursuit	  of	  thin	  collective	  wisdom.	  	  Thus,	  there	  is	  also	  an	  ongoing	  need	  for	  the	  individual	  virtues	  that	  enable	  thick	  collective	  wisdom.	  	  	  With	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  6	  This	  suggests	  a	  way	  of	  responding	  to	  value	  problem	  worries,	  but	  I	  have	  no	  worked	  out	  account	  of	  this.	  	  7	  Margaret	  Gilbert	  has	  raised	  the	  worry	  that	  a	  wise	  society	  is	  a	  less	  free	  society.	  
rapid	  and	  unpredictable	  changes	  occurring	  in	  an	  institution’s	  environment,	  the	  normal	  role	  specific	  expectations	  for	  an	  individual	  group	  member	  will	  often	  be	  insufficient	  for	  ongoing	  institutional	  success.	  This	  shows	  an	  ongoing	  need	  for	  the	  manifestation	  of	  individual	  epistemic	  virtues	  even	  in	  thinly	  wise	  institutions.	  	  	  	  I	  conclude	  this	  section	  by	  noting	  two	  additional	  features	  that	  any	  thickly	  wise	  collective	  would	  need	  to	  possess:	  	  curiosity	  and	  open-­‐mindedness.	  	  These	  are	  distinct	  properties,	  as	  one	  might	  be	  open-­‐minded	  in	  the	  consideration	  of	  other	  points	  of	  view	  without	  being	  in	  the	  least	  bit	  curious	  about	  them,	  or	  interested	  in	  whether	  those	  views	  are	  true	  or	  false8.	  	  In	  order	  for	  actions	  under	  a	  practical	  identity	  to	  constitute	  collective	  wisdom,	  they	  must	  be	  properly	  integrated	  with	  the	  agential	  structure	  of	  the	  collective.	  	  On	  this	  complex	  topic,	  I	  only	  want	  to	  say	  here	  that	  in	  some	  sense	  this	  integration	  will	  require	  that	  the	  collective	  is	  	  ‘curious’	  and	  ‘open	  minded’	  with	  respect	  to	  a	  practical	  identity.	  	  	  A	  collective	  that	  is	  not	  curious	  about	  its	  individual	  members	  may	  easily	  lack	  the	  motivation	  to	  identify	  and	  utilize	  	  outstanding	  	  individual	  performances.	  	  A	  collective	  that	  is	  not	  open-­‐minded	  toward	  its	  individual	  members	  may	  fail	  to	  give	  a	  novel	  point	  of	  view	  sufficient	  consideration.	  	  These	  are	  all	  important	  properties	  that	  collectives	  will	  need	  in	  order	  for	  exceptional	  individual	  actions	  to	  cause	  institutional	  actions,	  or	  to	  give	  the	  institution	  a	  compelling	  reason	  for	  action9.	  	  This	  kind	  of	  reason	  for	  collective	  action	  is	  distinctive	  because	  it	  will	  go	  beyond	  the	  reasons	  for	  collective	  action	  the	  institution	  would	  have	  strictly	  in	  virtue	  of	  its	  aggregation	  procedures	  and	  other	  organizational	  structures.	  	  A	  	  thinly	  wise	  institution	  will	  thus	  need	  qualities	  like	  curiosity	  and	  open-­‐mindedness	  to	  properly	  integrate	  and	  express	  the	  role	  specific	  supererogatory	  contributions	  of	  its	  individual	  members.	  	  
	  
6.	  Practical	  Implications	  of	  Thick	  Collective	  Wisdom	  	  	  Thick	  collective	  wisdom	  enjoins	  practical	  considerations	  that	  thin	  collective	  wisdom	  does	  not.	  One	  practical	  implication	  of	  the	  above	  account	  is	  that	  social	  policy	  has	  a	  clear	  interest	  in	  cultivating	  individual	  epistemic	  virtues,	  	  if	  they	  are	  indeed	  essential	  to	  thick	  collective	  wisdom	  as	  argued	  above.	  	  	  This	  is	  a	  less	  salient	  concern	  from	  the	  standpoint	  of	  thin	  collective	  wisdom,	  which	  might	  indeed	  even	  discourage	  reliance	  on	  individual	  epistemic	  virtues	  over	  the	  greater	  stability	  of	  a	  wise	  aggregation	  procedure.	  	  The	  claim	  I	  defend	  here	  is	  that	  the	  value	  of	  	  thick	  collective	  wisdom	  supports	  a	  general	  moral	  imperative	  in	  favor	  of	  cultivating	  individual	  epistemic	  virtues	  because	  of	  their	  ineliminable	  role	  in	  sustaining	  	  (even	  thinly)	  wise	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  8	  For	  recent	  work	  on	  curiosity	  see	  Whitcomb,	  Inan,	  Webber.	  	  On	  open	  mindedness	  see	  9	  .	  	  Robust	  integration	  makes	  thick	  collective	  wisdom	  a	  more	  collective	  property	  of	  wise	  collectives,	  although	  without	  integration	  actions	  under	  a	  practical	  identity	  are	  still	  sufficiently	  collective	  to	  warrant	  a	  thick	  wisdom	  attribution.	  	  	  	  	  
institutions.	  	  Exactly	  which	  epistemic	  virtues	  should	  be	  promoted	  will	  be	  another	  and	  perhaps	  vexing	  important	  question	  for	  social	  an	  education	  policy.	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